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A

mong the distinctive delicacies of southern British cuisine is a certain variety of smoked fish:

ship; the power or capacity of enduring; endurance.”
(OED). This is the first definition in the OED and is
marked by the editors as obsolete. It was the original
meaning of the English word from the time that it was
borrowed from French in the fifteenth century and
disappeared in the early nineteenth century. The more
modern usage is the third definition which began in
the mid-eighteenth century: “The action or practice
of tolerating; toleration; the disposition to be patient
with or indulgent to the opinions or practices of others; freedom from bigotry or undue severity in judging
the conduct of others; forbearance” (OED). As shown
by Williams’ and Jackson’s examination of the implicit
definition of tolerance in the psychological literature,
this is the general definition in use by psychologists.
The fact that the authors only found one article addressing the topic in the psychological literature indicates that psychologists have not given much thought
to the issue and generally use the common definitions
in circulation among the population at large. This is a
good thing, since they are not using some sort of private technical jargon.
Here is where a history of recent word usage might
help. The principal work on the Oxford English Dictionary was done in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The developments in the usage of tolerance in the last half century are of some importance
to understanding how the term is used. This has been
laid out with some clarity by D. A. Carson. Carson
notes that there are two general views held in Western
society and that both are given the label tolerance. One

“Red herring are whole fish, cured in salt and then
smoked for as long as three weeks, with their guts
still in place. Being treated thus makes them acquire a
reddish hue, and they become desiccated, hard to the
touch, and fiercely strong tasting. They were a peculiarly local creation, traditionally the speciality of these
two great herring towns and old foes, Great Yarmouth
and Lowestoft.” (Black, 2005: 272–73).

This comestible, known since at least the fourteenth
century (OED), is now rare partly due to over-fishing
and partly due to current preferences which tend away
from strong fish odors. In the seventeenth century
red herrings were used to train hunting dogs (OED),
as the strong scent would confuse the dogs and lead
them off the trail. Thus, “escaping criminals in the
17th century would drag strong-smelling red herring
across a trail to make pursuing bloodhounds lose the
scent.” (Hendrickson, 1997: 568). Thus, since the early nineteenth century, a “piece of information which is
or is intended to be misleading, or is a distraction from
the real question” is termed a red herring (OED).
As this example illustrates, the history of words is
an interesting study and the Oxford English Dictionary is an extremely useful tool for tracing the history
of words in English.
In their essay, Michael Williams and Aaron Jackson underutilize the Oxford English Dictionary
when they cite its definition of tolerance as “The action
or practice of enduring or sustaining pain or hard17

volume 37

issues in religion and psychotherapy

of these views precedes the other historically:

in value, that all worldviews have equal worth, that all
stances are equally valid. To question such postmodern
axioms is by definition intolerant. For such questioning there is no tolerance whatsoever, for it is classed as
intolerance and must therefore be condemned. It has
become the supreme vice. (Carson, 2012: 11-12).

Under the older view of tolerance, a person might be
judged tolerant if, while holding strong views, he or she
insisted that others had the right to dissent from those
views and argue their own cases. This view of tolerance
is in line with the famous utterance often (if erroneously) assigned to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you
say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”
This older view of tolerance makes three assumptions:
(1) there is an objective truth out there, and it is our
duty to pursue that truth; (2) the various parties in
a dispute think that they know what the truth of the
matter is, even though they disagree sharply, each party thinking the other is wrong; (3) nevertheless they
hold that the best chance of uncovering the truth of the
matter, or the best chance of persuading most people
with reason and not with coercion, is by the unhindered exchange of ideas, no matter how wrongheaded
some of those ideas seem. This third assumption demands that all sides insist that they opponents must
not be silenced or crushed. (Carson, 2012: 6-7).

Under the new understanding of tolerance, judging
someone or something is wrong because all values
are equally right and so forming as judgment about
something or someone is intolerant (e.g., Ammerman,
2014: 217; Riley, 2005: 2). So because of this equivocation in what is understood by the term, the subject
of tolerance has become a mine-field. No wonder that
Williams and Jackson see the importance of grappling
with the issue.
Carson sees the need “to think carefully about tolerance and intolerance” because
Every culture and every age necessarily displays some
tolerance and some intolerance. No culture can be tolerant of everything or intolerant of everything: it is
simply not possible. A culture that tolerates, say, genocide (e.g., the Nazis) will not tolerate, say, the Jews it
wants to kill or homosexual practice. A culture that
tolerates just about every sexual liaison may nevertheless balk at, say, rape, or pedophilia, or in many cases
bigamy and polygamy. (Carson, 2012: 47).

Carson explores some of the implications of this view:
The older view of tolerance held either that truth is
objective and can be known, and that the best way to
uncover it is bold tolerance of those who disagree, since
sooner or later the truth will win out; or that while
truth can be known in some domains, it probably cannot be known in other domains, and that the wisest
and least malignant course in such cases is benign tolerance grounded in the superior knowledge that recognizes our limitations. (Carson, 2012: 11).

Others have emphasized the importance of thinking
carefully about tolerance because the prevalent “moral relativism and complete tolerance for every other
point of view actually do not respect or honor those
points of views; quite the opposite.” When people say
they are being tolerant “what they are really, if unintentionally, saying is, ‘I don’t care enough about what
you think or believe to pay it any attention. Your view
doesn’t make any difference, it doesn’t deserve to be
taken seriously.’” (Smith, et al., 2011: 67-68). So for
many in the population at large, tolerance is simply a
respectable name for apathy.
Williams and Jackson see a way of promoting tolerance in the work of the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995). They do a respectable
job of concisely summarizing his thought as it can
apply to creating an understanding of tolerance in
psychology. The intention behind their work is good
and they make a good effort to elevate the discussion
of tolerance. If we thought in those terms we would
look at other people differently and the focus on toler-

This view has subsequently changed both subtly and
significantly:
The new tolerance argues that there is no one view that
is exclusively true. Strong opinions are nothing more
than strong preferences for a particular version of reality, each version equally true. . . . We must be tolerant,
not because we cannot distinguish the right path from
the wrong path, but because all paths are equally right.
(Carson, 2012: 11).

And here the trouble begins:
If you begin with this new view of tolerance, and then
elevate this view to the supreme position in the hierarchy of moral virtues, the supreme sin is intolerance.
The trouble is that such intolerance, like the new tolerance, also takes on a new definition. Intolerance is no
longer a refusal to allow contrary opinions to say their
piece in public, but must be understood to be questioning or contradicting the view that all opinions are equal
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ance would be on tolerating people and leave aside the
question of tolerating ideas. If their effort fails, it will
do so on two counts.
The first reason is that Levinas uses terms in an idiosyncratic way that becomes a special type of jargon.
One will not, for example, find the word totalize used
in the Oxford English Dictionary the way that the authors, following Levinas, have done. It may well be a
mistake to totalize others in the sense that the authors
and Levinas talk about, but that sort of language use is
opaque to the philosophically uninitiated. Having psychologists use philosophical jargon with patients who
are neither invites misunderstanding and confusion.
The second reason is that tolerance is something of
a red herring. The scriptures never use the term tolerance or the verb tolerate. The only form of the root
the scriptures use is the adjective tolerable, as in “It
shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day
of judgment, than for you.” (Matthew 11:22). This is
in the oldest English sense of tolerance as endurance.
Tolerance is not a Christian virtue. What the
scriptures ask us to have is not tolerance but charity.
Charity is not tolerance under any of the definitions
I have discussed. On the one hand, charity “beareth all
things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth
all things.” (Moroni 7:45). In this way, charity encompasses the original definition of tolerance as endurance
but surpasses it as it is more than just endurance. One
can tolerate, that is endure, something without hope.
On the other hand, charity “rejoiceth not in iniquity
but rejoiceth in the truth” (Moroni 7:45), which implies that there is truth and there is iniquity and that
the person possessing charity can discern between
them. This runs counter to what Carson describes as
the new view of tolerance:

Granted, because we “believe that man doth not
comprehend all the things which the Lord can comprehend” (Mosiah 4:9) our judgment will not be as
complete or accurate as God’s judgment, so we are
admonished to “see that ye do not judge wrongfully”
(Moroni 7:18). The Lord even told his prophet, “you
cannot always judge the righteous, or . . . you cannot
always tell the wicked from the righteous” (Doctrine
and Covenants 10:37). So Mormon tells us “I show
unto you the way to judge; for every thing which inviteth to do good, and to persuade to believe in Christ,
is sent forth by the power and gift of Christ; wherefore
ye may know with a perfect knowledge it is of God.
But whatsoever thing persuadeth men to do evil, and
believe not in Christ, and deny him, and serve not
God, then ye may know with a perfect knowledge it is
of the devil” (Moroni 7:16–17).
It is not just ideas that we must judge but people too.
“Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s
clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye
shall know them by their fruits” (3 Nephi 14:15–16;
cf. Matthew 7:15–16).
So we have charity not because we refrain from
judging but precisely because we have judged. Charity
informs our actions despite what we know about people and have judged about them. Acceptance of definitions of tolerance that require it to be non-judgmental, such as the new view or seemingly William’s and
Jackson’s new definition inspired by Levinas, mean
that tolerance runs counter to charity. Under those
definitions we cannot have charity and be tolerant at
the same time.
For a Christian, all this focus on tolerance should be
fishy. Depending on how we define it, tolerance can be
either a stepping stone to or a substitute for charity. If
starting with tolerance, that is endurance, leads us to
charity, it becomes a stepping stone. But tolerance understood as being non-judgmental conflicts with charity. When tolerance rather than charity is the goal, it
has become a red herring.

A commonplace among those who support the new
tolerance is that the enemies of tolerance are guilty of
adopting strongly asserted positions. They claim to
know the Truth (with a capital “T”), and that is precisely what makes them most likely to be intolerant.
(Carson, 2012: 81)

But the conflict between charity and certain definitions of tolerance runs deeper than that. Mormon’s
discourse on charity begins stating: “behold, my brethren, it is given unto you to judge, that ye may know
good from evil” (Moroni 7:15). Charity begins with
judging and being able to discern good from evil.
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